Many developing countries have increased their foreign reserve stocks dramatically in recent years, often motivated by the desire for precautionary self-insurance. One of the negative consequences of large accumulations for these countries is the risk of valuation losses. In this paper we examine the implications of systematic reserve decumulation by the Czech authorities aimed at mitigating valuation losses on euro-denominated assets. The policy was explicitly not intended to influence the value of the koruna relative to the euro. Initially the timing and size of reserve sales was not predictable, eventually sales occurred on a daily basis (in three equal installments within the day). This project examines whether these reserve sales, both during the regime of discretionary timing as well as when sales occurred every day, had unintended consequences for the domestic currency. Our findings using intraday exchange rate data and time-stamped reserve sales indicate that when decumulation occurred every day these sales led to significant appreciation of the koruna. Overall, our results suggest that the manner in which reserve sales are carried out matters for whether reserve decumulation influences the relative value of the domestic currency.
Introduction
China's official foreign exchange reserves hit $2.4 trillion in early 2010.
Although China is currently the country with the largest foreign reserve accumulation, reserves have risen dramatically for many emerging market countries in recent years. A number of studies have attempted to understand the motives for reserve accumulation, as well as the costs and benefits of reserve stocks.
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The Czech Republic became an independent state in January 1993
following the break-up of the Soviet Union. A decade later, in May 2004, it officially joined the European Union with a view toward eventually giving up the Czech Koruna (CZK) and joining the euro-zone.
In this paper we examine what happens when a country decides to reduce its foreign reserve holdings. While reserve accumulation in some countries is thought to be the byproduct of a government strategy to keep the international value of the domestic currency low in order to boost export growth, does it follow that reserve decumulation leads to domestic currency appreciation?
We test this hypothesis using unique intraday data on recent euro-denominated reserve sales by the Czech National Bank (CNB).
2 Although the Czech Republic has yet to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), a pre-condition for joining the eurozone 3 , the CNB intervened frequently in the CZK-EUR market through September 2002.
Throughout this period the CNB was largely engaged in leaning-against-the-wind operations to slow down the steady appreciation of the koruna relative to the euro (over the period 1999 through September 2002 the koruna appreciated by over 25% against the euro). The koruna abruptly reversed direction in the fall of 2002, and depreciated relative to the euro through early 2004 (during which time the CNB ceased intervening).
In April 2004, as the koruna again began to appreciate against the euro, the CNB announced that it would begin to sell some its euro-denominated reserves. At that time, the euro value of its foreign reserve holdings was €21.9 billion (or $26.3b). The apparent rationale for the policy of reserve decumulation was to reduce the valuation losses that followed from the fact that Czech reserves are largely denominated in euros, the value of which was falling relative to the koruna. At the same time, the CNB was explicit in not wanting to influence, and in particular further appreciate, the koruna relative to the euro.
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The CNB decision to sell euro-denominated reserves starting in 2004 seems to have been well understood by market participants, but the timing and size of sales was not pre-announced. In June 2007 the CNB changed its discretionary approach to reserve sales; from this point on it sold €3m on a daily basis (in three equal installments within the day) through the end our data sample in November 2007. 4 The CNB intervened on 1,247 occasions over the period 1997 through September 2002. See Disyatat and Galati (2007) , Egert and Komarek (2006) , Gersl and Holub (2006) , and Scalia (2008) for analyses of these operations.
This project examines whether these CNB reserve sales, both during the regime of discretionary timing as well as when sales occurred every day, had unintended consequences. We specifically test 5 See IMF Country Report No. 04/266 ( http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04266.pdf ) which states that the CNB recent decision to begin selling reserves was aimed solely at limiting further accumulation of reserves and "was not intended to influence the level of the exchange rate" (page 12). 6 The daily sales amount of €3m is consistent with what can be inferred from the publicly available CNB data on unsettled foreign exchange transactions (http://www.cnb.cz/en/financial_markets/foreign_exchange_market/DEVOP_EUR_ENG.HTML).
whether these euro-denominated reserve sales influenced the CZK-EUR rate, while controlling for other factors that may have affected the relative value of the koruna.
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Our results suggest that over the full sample period, and the first (discretionary) regime, there is little evidence that euro reserve sales influenced the koruna. However, the decumulation in 2007, when the CNB sold euros every business day, led to a statistically significant appreciation of the koruna relative to the euro.
This finding that rules-based reserve sales lead to the relative appreciation of the domestic currency is surprising and intriguing. Economic theory generally suggests that "expected" policies are less likely to have an influence than "unexpected"
ones. 8 Yet it is during the regime in which the CNB sold reserves every day that the sales seem to have influenced the value of the koruna. 9 The results are also surprising in the context of the intervention literature. It remains controversial whether traditional foreign exchange interventions operations, which are generally intended to influence currency values, are able to do so. 10 7 The CNB has followed an inflation-targeting monetary regime since 1998. Actual Czech inflation generally kept well within its target range over our sample period (the CNB inflation target band was 3-5% in 2004 3-5% in , 2-4% in 2005 3-5% in , 3% in 2006 3-5% in and 2% in March 2007 . It is generally the case that countries that effectively target inflation sterilize their foreign currency operations. In the CNB case, sales of foreign reserves, if not sterilized with a matching increase in domestic assets, would result in a decrease in the monetary base. Our empirical specification controls for the possibility that reserve sales are not sterilized by including a daily (11am CET) Czech short-term interest rate (the 3-Month PRIBOR rate). The daily PRIBOR rate is statistically insignificant in all specifications estimated across the full sample period as well as the two subsamples, and inclusion of the interest rate does not influence any of the coefficient estimates on the other explanatory variables in the regressions, indicating that CNB reserve sales are sterilized. These results are available from the authors upon request.
In this case reserve sales were explicitly not 8 For an early example see Sargent and Wallace (1975) who show that if expectations are formed rationally (and there are no other sources of stickiness in the price mechanism) anticipated policies should have no real effects. 9 Although reserves sales occurred every day it is worth noting that market participants at the time did not know whether this regime would continue indefinitely, as a consequence the sales can't be considered perfectly anticipated. 10 See Dominguez and Frankel (1993) , Dominguez (2006) , Dominguez and Panthaki (2007) , Fatum and Pedersen (2009), Fatum (2008) and Kearns and Rigobon (2005) for discussions of the efficacy of traditional intervention policy.
intended as interventions in currency markets, but our results nonetheless suggest they did have an influence.
This study examines the effects of Czech National Bank sales of eurodenominated reserves on the koruna. In the next section we describe the institutional context in which the Czech authorities decided to decumulate their foreign reserves. In section 3 we detail the intraday data that we use to test the hypothesis that reserve decumulation leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency. Section 4 describes the econometric methodology that we use to take into account the seasonal features of intraday exchange rate movements and section 5 provides estimation results from regressions of CZK-EUR returns on CNB reserve sales. Section 6 provides robustness checks and our conclusions are in section 7. Figure 1 shows that Czech reserve holdings during our sample period were high relative to other emerging market countries with similar per capita GDP. However, if we compare Czech reserve holdings to other Eastern European countries and Russia (figure 2); they are closer to the median, well below Poland and Russia, but higher than 
Institutional Aspects of CNB Reserve Sales

Data
The reserve data used in this study cover all CNB transactions over the 1 January 2004 to 23 November 2007 period. The data is provided by the CNB, and the sample period is determined by data availability. The data include transaction specific information: the euro value of each sale and the time-stamp to the nearest minute. During our sample period all CNB reserve transactions are sales of euro-denominated assets. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the CNB reserve sales data.
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The high-frequency CZK-EUR exchange rate data is from GenesisFT, and CNB reserves was €23.7 billion, so total euro sales of €707 million amounts to 3.5% of the total stock. Figure 4 shows that the koruna value of CNB reserve stocks fell by around 13% over this four year period, this decline in value is due both to the appreciation of the koruna and sales of reserves.
spot rate at the end of every 15-minute interval over every 24-hour period. The rates are indicative quotes posted by traders. We follow Dacorogna, Müller, Nagler, Olsen and Pictet (1993) and filter the data for anomalies and bad quotes.
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Consistent with other intraday studies focusing on currency pairs with limited trading outside of local business hours (see Fatum and Pedersen 2009), we define a trading day in the Czech currency market to start at 8am (7.00 GMT+1) and finish at 6pm (17.00 GMT+1).
14 Czech and Euro-area interest rates, which are used as controls in our empirical analysis, are obtained from the websites of the CNB (www.cnb.cn/en) and the ECB (www.ecb.int), respectively. Time-stamped Czech and Euro-area macro announcements and preceding survey expectations are obtained from Bloomberg. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the CZK-EUR intraday exchange rate, the interest rates and the macro news.
As a result, our analysis spans 1,005 trading days and a total of 41,205 15-minute observations. All CNB reserve sales transactions were carried out during Prague business hours, so that they are consistent with our trading day definition.
While the exchange rate is quoted every 15 minutes, reserve transaction times were provided to the minute. We therefore cumulate reserve transactions in each 15-minute interval.
Econometric Methodology
In order to take into account the long memory and intraday seasonality that characterizes high-frequency exchange rates, our baseline estimates of the response of the koruna exchange rates to CNB euro reserve sales follow the two-step weighted least squares (WLS) procedure developed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) . Specifically, we model the response of the CZK-EUR exchange rate as a linear function of J lagged values of the exchange rate itself and the contemporaneous and K lags of the reserve sales variable, R t :
(1)
where s t is the first-difference in logs of the CZK-EUR spot exchange rate. As noted earlier, T=41,205. We include 3 lags (45 minutes) of CZK-EUR returns (J=3) based on the Schwartz and Akaike information criteria and include prior reserves sales in the previous 75 minutes (K=5); we vary the number of time lags in our robustness checks.
The estimation procedure is as follows: first, we estimate equation (1) by OLS and obtain the estimated residuals, t εˆ; next we model the volatility pattern using these estimated residuals. We follow Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) in using the following parameterization:
where the absolute value of the residuals in equation (1) proxies for volatility in the 15-minute interval t, c is a vector of normalizing constants, n is the number of intervals in a day (in our case 40), t σˆis the one-day ahead volatility forecast for day t (i.e. the day that contains interval t), q is a specific intraday calendar effect, Q is the total number of calendar effects accounted for (Q=5, based on the Schwartz and the Akaike information criteria), and t u denotes the residuals (assumed to be standard normal). We model the lower frequency intraday pattern (the first term after the vector of constants) using realized volatility, and we model the higher frequency periodicity by inclusion of the Fourier flexible form (the terms in the parenthesis of equation 2).
In order to take into account the possibility that volatility is also influenced by macroeconomic news, we follow Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) , by including CNB reserve sales in the volatility equation.
Results
Baseline Estimations
We estimate the baseline WSL regression model over the full sample (1) and (2), respectively. The first column of Table 3 shows that for the full sample the coefficient estimates associated with the first, third, and fourth lags of euro-denominated reserves sales are significant at either 95 or 90% significance levels, and these coefficients are of the expected negative sign (sales of euro-denominated reserves are associated with a CZK appreciation). The Wald test of the hypothesis that the (negative) sum of the estimated reserve sales coefficients is equal to zero is marginally rejected at 90% significance.
The discretionary sales regime (subsample 1) results shown in column 2 are similar to those found for the full sample, though we find that the cumulative (negative) effect of reserve sales is insignificant. These results suggest that during the first three years of discretionary reserve sales the CNB was able reduce its euro-denominated reserve holdings without adversely affecting the value, in domestic currency terms, of its remaining euro-denominated reserves.
However, this result is reversed in the rules-based regime in 2007. The subsample 2 results, shown in column 3, indicate that reserve sales significantly impact the CZK rate (at the 99% significance level). Further, the Wald test strongly rejects (again at the 99% significance level) that the (negative) sum of the estimated reserve sales coefficients is equal to zero. These estimates suggest that during sub-sample 2 CNB reserve sales influenced the CZK rate in the theoretically consistent but, from a policy perspective, undesired direction. Table 4 displays the results of the estimation of the volatility model described in equation (2). Whether we estimate the volatility model across the full sample (column 1), sub-sample 1 (column 2), or sub-sample 3 (column 3), our results suggest that reserve sales are associated with reduced exchange rate volatility. While the realized volatility term associated with lower frequency periodicity is highly significant, the trigonometric terms are largely insignificant, suggesting an absence of intraday calendar effects in this market.
Reaction Functions and Unexpected Reserve Sales
It is possible that the specific timing of reserve sales transactions -for subsample 1 in terms of intraday timing as well as in terms of the specific days on which reserve sales occur, and for sub-sample 2 in regards only to intraday timing -is influenced by both the contemporaneous exchange rate movement (i.e. the change in the exchange rate that occurs over the 15-minute interval within which a reserve sale is carried out) and the recent (lagged) exchange rate movements. Furthermore, a close inspection of the reserve sales data reveals that reserve sales transactions tend to be episodic both across days and within days, suggesting that current reserve sales are significantly correlated with recent (lagged) reserve sales. As a result, our reserve sales variable may contain an expected component that, if unaccounted for, will lead to an underestimation of the true effect of reserve sales on exchange rates. In other words, despite the high-frequency of our data, our study may not be immune to endogeneity.
In order to control for this potential endogeneity, we follow a similar strategy as the daily data studies by Humpage (1999) and Namalendran and Naranjo (2000) and the intraday study by Fatum and Pedersen (2009) . We first estimate a CNB reserve sales reaction function in order to capture the expected component of reserve sales. We then use the residuals from the reserve sales reaction function estimation (i.e.
we subtract the expected component of reserve sales from the actual reserve sales) as a measure of unexpected reserve sales. In this way we can obtain an estimate of the influence of unexpected CNB reserve sales on the CZK-EUR exchange rate that is free of simultaneity bias.
The results of the reaction function estimation are provided in Interestingly, the sub-sample 2 reaction function results are markedly different, confirming that a change in CNB sale strategy took place. First, lagged exchange rate movements no longer help predict reserve sales, implying that sales are no longer aimed at timing the market. Second, while the first lag of reserve sales is still significant and positive, the remaining significant lags are negative, suggesting that unless a reserve sale is immediately followed by another transaction, the likelihood of seeing more sales decreases. These results are consistent with the fact that during sub-sample 2 it is always the case that three reserve sales occur on each business day (though the timing of these sales is not the same across days).
The results of the re-estimation of the conditional mean model described in Equation (1) using unexpected reserve sales in place of the actual reserve sales are provided in Table 6 . The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline estimation results that are carried out without controlling for endogeneity ( The estimated results of re-running equations (1) and (2) with the macro news variables included are shown in Table 7. 17 16 In another set of estimations we include the first lag of macro news as well, to take into account the possibility of slower adjustment in this market, and find the results to be unchanged. These estimation results are not shown for brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
The estimated coefficients indicate that, with few exceptions, macro surprises exert no significant influence on the CZK-EUR exchange rate. Of more importance to our research question, the table also shows that the inclusion of macro news does not in any way change the previously reported results regarding the influence of reserve sales on currency values.
Robustness
In order to test the robustness of our results, we carry out the analysis using a different econometric procedure, a different reserve sales lag-structure, a different subsample demarcation point, and a different trading day definition. Additionally, we investigate whether the reserve sales are anticipated by traders by testing for lead effects.
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First, the gain in efficiency from the WLS procedure is potentially costly in terms of inconsistent estimates if the residuals from the initial estimation of equation (1) are improperly fitted in the volatility model described by equation (2). In order to address this potential concern we also estimate the baseline model using heteroskedasticity-and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard errors (i.e. we re-estimate equation (1) using
HAC errors). The HAC results are qualitatively identical to the conditional mean results
based on the two-step WLS procedure.
Second, in order to test for delayed effects of reserve sales beyond the 5th lag captured by our baseline model, we re-estimate our models with an additional 4 lags (60 minutes) of reserve sales included. These estimates confirm that reserve sales are only significantly associated with an appreciation of the CZK in subsample 2.
Furthermore, none of the additional reserve sales lags (lags 6 through 9) are individually significant, and a separate test of the hypothesis that the sum of the reserve sales coefficients for lags 6 through 9 equals zero is not rejected.
Third, we change the sub-sample demarcation point. Fourth, in order to ensure that the possibility of abnormal trading activity at either the beginning or the end of the trading day is not affecting our results we respectively shrink and expand our trading day definition by 60 minutes, i.e. we first redo the baseline estimations with a trading day defined to start at 7:30am (6.30 GMT+1) and finish at 6:30pm (17.30 GMT+1) and, subsequently, a trading day defined to start at 8:30am (7.30 GMT+1) and finish at 5:30pm (16.30 GMT+1).
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Fifth, we address the possibility that the market anticipates and, therefore, systematically prices in the effect of the reserve sales prior to their occurrence by testing for the presence of lead effects of reserve sales. Specifically, we add two (30 minutes)
The estimation results associated with these alternative trading day definitions are qualitatively identical to the previously discussed results. 19 We also momentarily disregard any institutional insights and visually detectable data structure in order to test for an unknown break-point (see Andrews 1993 
Conclusion
Economists have long studied the question of optimal reserve holdings by governments. Foreign reserve stocks have risen dramatically for many developing countries in recent years, often motivated by the desire for precautionary self-insurance.
However, one of the negative consequences of large accumulations of reserves denominated in foreign currency for these countries is the risk of valuation losses. In this paper we examine the implications of systematic reserve decumulation, intended to mitigate valuation losses, on domestic currency movements. Our findings are striking.
We find little evidence that reserve decumulation influences the exchange rate when sales are carried out on a discretionary basis. By contrast, our results show that when these sales are carried out in a rules-based manner -identical amounts sold every business day -a significant appreciation of the domestic currency follows. The economic significance of this appreciation is not negligible. The estimates suggest that the cummulative effect on the CZK of Czech National Bank euro-denominated reserve sales in 2007 (of approximately €700 million) led to a 4.9% appreciation of the koruna relative to the euro.
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Our estimates of the effects of reserve decumulation by the Czech authorities are qualitatively similar to estimates in the literature of the effects of intervention in currency markets, even though the CNB explicitly did not intend to influence the value of the koruna with these operations. Dominguez and Frankel (1993) find that a $100 million purchase by the Fed leads to a 1.6% appreciation of the dollar, while Kearns and Rigobon (2005) find that a $100 million purchase of AUD by the Australian Central Bank leads to a 1.8% appreciation of the AUD, and a Bank of Japan purchase of $100 million JPY leads to a .2% appreciation of the JPY.
It is important to note that the reserve decumulation we study in this project occurs over a time period in which the CNB and its currency, the koruna, was not in These calculations are based on the assumption that the Chinese government publicly pre-announces the decumulation policy, that it systematically sells dollar assets every day, and that it allows the yuan to appreciate. On the other hand, if
China instead followed the initial Czech approach to decumulation, selling reserves in a more discretionary manner, our findings suggest that it might be possible for China to likewise shed dollar assets without impacting the yuan exchange rate. Our priors are that the likely reaction of markets to a gradual decumulation of dollar-denominated reserve assets by China would likely lie somewhere between these two estimates.
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